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ABSTRACT 
Prior to 1985,  ten states  adopted some  kind of indexing  provisions  for 
their personal income  tax systems.  Seven of these states  subsequently 
suspended their  indexing laws  for one or more years.  In this paper we 
examine the states'  experience  with income  tax  indexing  and see what 
lessons can be drawn from it.  We describe  the  indexing  statutes,  and 
estimate simple  econometric  models  of both the decisions  to adopt indexing 
and to renege  on a promise to index. 
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When  an income tax is based upon nominal income, then in general, the 
real burden  of  taxation  depends upon  the rate of inflation.  The most 
popularly understood way in which  inflation  affects taxes is "bracket creep." 
As  nominal income increases, the individual is pushed into brackets with 
higher marginal tax  rates.  Hence, the proportion of income that is taxed 
increases despite the fact that  real income stays the same.  Another  effect of 
inflation occurs  because exemptions  and  the standard  deduction  are set in 
nominal terms.  Increases in  the price level  decrease their real value,  again 
increasing the effective tax rate.1 
Inflation, then, leads to  unlegislated increases in  the real burden of the 
income tax.  Aaron [1976,  p.  101  points out that for  the federal income tax, 
historically these effects have  been mitigated  by a  series of ad hoc 
reductions in statutory rates.  Such cuts in  the federal income tax were 
enacted in  1969,  1971,  1975,  1976,  1977,  and  1981.  An alternative to  such  ad 
hoc arrangements is to index  the tax  system,  i.e.,  to  legislate a formula  which 
automatically  removes  the influence of inflation  from real tax liabilities. 
Why  should it matter whether the effects of  inflation  are mitigated  by ad 
hoc measures or by an indexing  formula?  The key  distinction is that 
indexing  is supposed to  represent  a serious commitment by the government to 
a given real  tax  schedule, i.e.,  a relationship between real income and  real 
tax  burdens.  Although  the tax schedule might change in  the future, it would 
be a consequence of explicit  legislative changes, and  not the vagaries of the 
inflation rate.  Ex ante, a  series of ad hoc adjustments does  not  provide the 
same kind  of certainty.2 
With legislation passed in 1981, the federal government  made  its first 
move toward  indexing-—bracket  widths, the personal exemption, and  the 
1 standard  deduction  are  now  adjusted annually by  the  rate  of change  in  the 
consumer  price index.  As  is  well  known, these provisions went  into  effect in 
1985.  Somewhat less well  known is that prior to  1985,  ten states adopted 
some kind  of  indexing  provisions for  their  own  personal income  tax  systems. 
And  even  less well  known  is that  of these ten states, seven suspended their 
indexing laws for one or  more years.  So much for commitment. 
The purpose of this  paper is to  examine the states' experience with 
income tax indexing and  see  what lessons can be drawn from it.  Section  II 
provides a description of the relevant statutes.  Section  III  examines the 
circumstances that  led  some states  to adopt indexing,  and  why  some of them 
subsequently reneged on  their  promises.  Section  IV  concludes with  a 
summary, suggestions for  future  research, and  discussion of  possible 
implications  for federal tax reform. 
II.  State Indexing Laws 
This  section provides summaries of the various state indexing laws.  We 
begin with  descriptions of the relevant statutes,  and  then  provide a 
quantitative summary.  The information  was culled from various editions of 
the State Tax  Review,  published by  Commerce  Clearing  House;  the state 
income tax forms;  and, in  some cases, direct communication with the various 
state revenue offices. 
A.  The Indexing Statutes. 
State  tax systems differ widely  with respect to the items that are 
indexed,  and  how  these items are adjusted in response to changes in  the 
price  level.  Generally,  indexing  statutes apply to one  or more of the 
following items:  bracket widths,  personal exemptions, standard deductions, 
and  the ranges over which vanishing deductions and  credits are phased out. 
Before  discussing the specifics of the various statutes,  we should note one 
2 important feature  that  they  have  in  common——no attempt at all is made to 
index  capital income.  Thus,  the important distortions due  to  the inclusion  of 
inflationary gains and  losses in the computation  of the tax  base are ignored. 
Arizona's  income taxes  were first indexed  in  1978 on a  temporary basis; 
the arrangement was made permanent in  1980.  Indexing is quite 
thorough——the  tax  brackets, standard  deduction, personal exemptions, a 
property tax credit and  a  rent credit are all  included.  (However, a ceiling 
on  the deduction for child care allowances  is  unindexed.)  The price index 
used is the Phoenix  Consumer Price  Index (CPI)  for  the fiscal year ending in 
the tax year.  The implied changes in  bracket widths,  etc., are rounded down 
to  the nearest  $10. 
One  peculiarity of the Arizona law is that  the standard  deduction is 
over-indexed.  En  1978,  the standard  deduction  was  10  percent of Adjusted 
Gross  Income,  with a minimum of $500 and  a maximum  of  $1000.  The Arizona 
statute  indexes not only  the  minimum  and  maximum amounts,  but also the 
percentage rate used in the calculation.  By  1985,  the percentage rate  was 
18.3 percent,  with a  minimum of  $917,  and  a maximum  of $1834.  When  we 
contacted the Arizona  tax authorities to  confirm our understanding of their 
law, apparently  no  one realized what  was happening.  At  the  time  of this 
writing, a modification  of the statute is under  consideration. 
California  began indexing  income brackets in  1978.  The same law 
prescribed  indexing  of the personal exemptions, dependent deductions and 
low  income credit beginning in  1979.  The limit on capital losses, the child 
care credit,  and  the rent credit remained  unindexed.  For  1978 and  1979, the 
adjustment factor was  the California  CPI  minus three  percent  (but not  less 
than zero).  For  1980 on,  the factor was the change in  the California CPI for 
the 12  months  ending in  June of the tax  year.  Bracket widths are rounded 
3 to  the nearest  $10, and other  items  to  the nearest  $1.  This  brings  us  to a 
feature of California's  law that  is shared by a  number of other 
states--rounding  errors are not carried forward.  Suppose, for  example, that 
according  to  the change in the CPI, bracket widths should  be increased by 
$9.  Then no  change in  the bracket widths occur.  Now suppose that the next 
year's  experience  also implies a $9  increase.  Again there is no change.  In 
short,  the cumulative effect  of several years  of  low  inflation  can  lead  to 
substantial increases in real tax burdens. 
Colorado's  indexing  statute went  into effect in 1978.  Personal exemptions, 
income brackets and the standard  deduction  were  covered; food, fuel and 
property tax credits  were  not.  The index  amount was to  be set annually by 
the legislature.  If the legislature failed  to take action,  the law specified a 
default amount:  6  percent for  the period  1978—85,  and  3  percent  starting  in 
1986. 
Does  Colorado's law represent true indexing?  Clearly,  if  the legislature 
can set the adjustment factor without reference  to any external standard,  the 
commitment to  keeping the real tax function unchanged is weakened.  On the 
other hand, the law  does  embody a commitment to  review the inflation 
situation annually, a commitment that is backed  up  by the presence of the 
default option.  In any case, in  1983  these considerations became moot for 
the citizens of Colorado when the law  was suspended for  each of the years 
1983,  1984 and 1985. 
Iowa adopted indexation  temporarily  for  1979 and  1980,  and  made it 
permanent in  1980.  Only the income brackets and  an annuity  exclusion  were 
indexed;  the standard  deduction, personal exemption  and  general credit were 
not.  The adjustment factor  used  for  1979 was  25  percent of the change in 
the CPI for the entire U.S.  For  1980  and subsequent  years,  50  percent of 
4 the change  in  the  GNP  deflator was specified.  Interestingly,  indexation  was 
made conditional on  the presence of an unobligated  general fund surplus of 
sixty  million  dollars at the close of the fiscal year.  This  event has not 
occurred  since  1978.  In effect, then,  Iowa  built reneging rig  into its 
statute.  One  should note,  however,  that  the  law  indicating the size of the 
surplus is also subject  to change. 
Maine  adopted an indexation law for  1981 and  subsequent  years via a 
referendum held in  1982.  The  years  specified  in  the preceding sentence are 
not typographical errors.  Indexing was passed in a  voter initiative held 
early  in  1982,  and  the initiative stipulated that indexing would  apply to taxes 
on  1981 income due  in  1982.  The initiative was challenged  in  court on the 
basis of its retroactivity.  The Supreme  Court of Maine  ruled that  the 
initiative was legal, but  meanwhile the legislature managed  to postpone 
application  of the  law  until  1983.  The personal exemption and  the standard 
deduction  were indexed, but only for those in income brackets  below $15,000 
for  single individuals and  separate returns, $22,500 for  heads of households, 
and  $30,000  for  joint returns.  These limits were also indexed.  The property 
tax  credit  was not indexed.  The adjustment factor was  50 percent of the 
increase in  the U.S.  CPI  during the twelve  months ending in  June of the tax 
year, but not more than 7  percent.  Values were  rounded to  the nearest  $10, 
and  roundoff errors were  not carried  forward. 
Minnesota  adopted indexing  for  1979.  Brackets were  to  be indexed for 
1979 onward;  and  the low  income deduction, standard deduction and  general 
credit for  1981 onward.  In  1980,  indexing  was repealed  for  the  low  income 
deduction, a slightly curious move for a  state  with a reputation for  being 
liberal.  At  the same  time,  brackets  were  to  be adjusted  by a  different factor 
than other  amounts: the bracket adjustment was 85  percent of the change in 
5 the Twin Cities  CPI of the  12  months ending in  August  of the tax  year; other 
items were adjusted by 100  percent of that  change.  The standard  deduction 
was rounded to the nearest  $100; the rounding error was  not  to  be carried 
forward. Other  items  were rounded to  the nearest  one dollar. 
A  number  of important changes were  made in  Minnesota's  law in 1981; i) 
Hach year,  every taxpayer's  taxable  income  is multiplied  by  a  "Taxable let 
Income Adjustment Factor" (TNIAF), a number which,  when multiplied  by each 
taxpayers taxable  income, ensures  that average taxable  income will grow at 
the same rate as average gross  income.  The  TNIAF is bounded below by 
one.  This  factor was introduced to  meet concerns that  the  1979 law  was 
leading  to  a reduction in the real value of the tax base.  (The main element 
in  this  erosion was the fact  that  (unindexed)  federal tax  payments are 
deductible on Minnesota  tax returns, so  as federal tax liabilities grew, 
Minnesota  tax collections  fell.)  ii)  The adjustment factor was based on  the 
change in the CPI for  urban  consumers  (CPI—U)  for  the  12  months ending in 
September  of the tax year.  However, the adjustment factor  could  not exceed 
the rate of increase in  Minnesota  gross income.  iii)  Brackets were to be 
indexed  at  100  percent of the adjustment factor, not  the previous figure of 
85 percent.  iv)  Brackets were  to  be rounded  to the nearest  $10,  with 
rounding errors  not  carried forward.  Taking  items i)  through iv) together, 
we can infer  that  making the system comprehensible was not a major 
consideration in  the design of the Minnesota indexing law. 
Another feature  of the  1981 law  was a  provision for automatic  suspension 
of  indexing  in  periods of financial  stringency.  However, this  section was 
repealed in 1985 when it became apparent that it  might actually go  into 
effect.  A  new rate  schedule was introduced at that  time. 
Montana adopted indexing  for  1981 onward  via a referendum held  in 
6 1980.  Bracket widths, the personal exemption and  the maximum  standard 
deduction were  to  be adjusted  each  year by  the change in  the U.S.  CPI-tJ 
for  the months  ending in  June of the tax  year.  Brackets were  rounded to 
the nearest  $100,  and  other items  to  the nearest $10.  Rounding errors were 
carried  forward. 
Oregon  adopted indexation in  1979 for  tax years  1981 onward.  Only the 
personal exemption  was indexed.  In  1982,  the law was suspended 
retroactively to  1981.  Moreover, during  the years  1983—1985,  the personal 
exemption  itself was temporarily removed,  and  replaced by a general credit, 
which  was not indexed.  In effect, then, indexing  was removed.  In  1985,  the 
change from an exemption to a credit was  made  permanent, and  the credit 
was indexed to the Portland CPI,  beginning in 1986. 
South  Carolina adopted indexing  in  1980,  effective in  1982.  Only bracket 
widths were affected.  However, in 1983,  before 1982 taxes were paid, the 
effective date was postponed to  1984 and  the adjustment factor reduced to  25 
percent of the CPI.  For  1985,  the adjustment factor used  was twenty—five 
percent of that  in  the federal tax law for  bracket widths,  and  100 percent 
for  the standard  deduction  and  personal exemptions. 
Wisconsin adopted an indexing statute in  1979,  effective for  1980.  Only 
income brackets  were  indexed;  the personal exemption, standard  deduction, 
rent, property,  and general credits were  not.  The adjustment factor was the 
June  to June change in the CPI for  the entire U.S. minus  3  percent. 
Indexing was suspended in  1983. 
B.  Summary. 
Table  2.1  summarizes  some of the information  from this discussion.  For 
the period 1978-1985,  it  shows  for  each state the adjustment factor applied to 
whatever items were indexed.  Thus, for example, Arizona's  figure of  16.0 for 
7 1980 means that the 1980 tax parameters were  determined  by applying a  16 
percent adjustment factor to  their  1979 values.  For  purposes of reference, 
the last line records  the percentage change in  the  U.S.  CPT as a whole.  An 
asterisk (*) indicates that  indexing  was promised  for  that year,  but  was then 
suspended. 
Table  2.1  does  not  do justice  to the heterogeneity of the various indexing 
statutes across states;  however,  a  tabular representation of all  the provisions 
would  be unwieldy.  In any case, if we seek to assess the impact of a  given 
state's indexing statute, we  must  view it in  the context of the rest of that 
state's tax code.  However, the tax codes themselves differ dramatically from 
state to state, both with respect  to  the tax base  and  tax schedule.  (See 
Feenberg and  Rosen  [1986].)  These considerations suggest  that  a sensible 
characterization of the extent of  indexing  must  embody  some  sort  of 
comparison  between the revenue yield of the actual (indexed)  tax system, and 
what  the yield  would have  been in  the absence of indexing.  Specifically, 
let 
H,0  be a state's  revenue  during  a given year.  Now suppose  that 
prices  and incomes  increase  at rate  ' .  Let  H.  be the associated 
revenues  given  that year's  indexing  law, end  R  the revenues  that would 
have been generated  without indexing.  Thus,  under the indexing  law,  real 
revenues increase  from 
Rb  to  R/(l+t)  ,  while without  indexing,  they 
would  have increased  from  to  RJ(l+7T)  .  Otir measure for the extent 
of indexing  is 
— 
H.0  I  1  — 
R/(1+7r) — 
Rb 
Th.i,  I  measures  the proportion  of the inflationary  increase  in real taxes 
that  is returned  to the taxpayer  by the indexing  law.  Note that 
with a perfectly  indexed  tax,  real tax burdens are unchanged  by inflation, 
i.e.,  R1/(l+n)  R., 
.  In  this  case,  I  I 
8 Because  the tax schedules  are nonlinear,  a state's  value  of I 
in a given  year will in  general  depend  upon it.  If one wants to examine 
the evolution  of the various indexing  statutes  over time,  it makes sense  to 
compute  I  using the same  value of  ii for  each  year.  In this  way,  one 
does  not confound  changes  induced by statutory  modifications  with changes 
induced  by inflation.  On the other  hand,  if one is interested  in how a 
state's  statute actually  operated  in a given year, 
ii  should  be the actual 
inflation  rate.  The figures  in Table  2.2 show values  of  I  for 1978—84 
calculated  both ways.  The figures  without  brackets  are computed  conditional 
on " =  0.06;  the figures  within  brackets  are based  on the actual  inflation 
experience  of that year. 
As expected  from our earlier  description  of the statutes,  there  are 
considerable  differences  across  states.  A striking  and unexpected 
result  is that a number  of state income  taxes  are over—indexed——I  > 1 
This phenomenon  is explainable  by the facts  that:  a) federal income 
taxes  paid are deductible  on some state  income  tax returns,  and b) during 
the time period  under  consideration  in the table,  the federal  tax system 
had no indexing.  Hence,  when  nominal income  goes  up, nominal  state  income 
tax payments  decrease  due to indexing  and a greater  federal  tax deduction. 
Both effects  taken  together  can result  in a lower  real state income  tax 
burden. 
III.  To  Index or Not to  Index? 
A.  The Characteristics of Indexing vs. Non-Indexing  Sates 
Thie section examines  the factors that influence a state's indexing 
status.  Our first goal  is to see  if  there are any obvious differences between 
the states  which at any time chose  to  index  and  those that  did  not.  A  glance 
at Table  2.1  suggests  that geography is not a major factor.  Each major 
9 region is  represented  by  at  least one state.  Similarly, states with  varying 
political  traditions are included in the  table——Minnesota and Oregon,  for 
example, are generally considered to be liberal, while Arizona  and  South 
Carolina are conservative. 
Table 3.1  shows  the differences between  states  that ever voted for 
indexing and  those that did not  with respect  to  the  1982 values of a  number 
of important fiscal and  demographic  variables.4  (Data sources are 
documented  in  the Appendix.)  The table  indicates that with  respect to 
population,  personal income per capita,  general expenditures per capita, per 
capita debt, and  deficits per  capita, the differences between  indexing and 
non—indexing  states are not  very great.  The income and  deficit figures  are 
virtually identical.  Indexing states  have somewhat larger populations and  per 
capita government expenditures, and smaller  per  capita debts, but these 
differences are not statistically significant.5 
On  the other hand, the revenue  structures of the indexing and 
non-indexing states are quite different.  First,  indexing states raised  36 
percent of tax revenues  from the personal income tax; the comparable  figure 
for  non—indexers was  27 prcent.  The difference is statistically significant 
Are the income tax systems themselves different?  As is well—known,  for 
complicated  non-proportional tax schedules, in  general there  is no single 
number that can characterize the entire schedule.  Table  3.1  therefore 
presents  several different  measures:  the elasticity of revenues  with  respect 
to income; and the marginal tax rates on individuals with $10,000, $20,000, and 
$40,000 incomes.  On average, the elasticity is higher in indexing than 
non—indexing  states, as are the marginal tax rates at each  income level. 
The last entry  in  the table is a dichotomous  variable which indicates 
whether the state had a tax or expenditure limitation  (TEL)  statute in place 
10 in  1982.  (See Kenyon and  Benker  [1984].)  Sixty percent of  indexing  states 
had  TEL's;  the comparable  figure for the non-indexers was  27.2  percent. 
This  perhaps  suggests  that states  which sought to curtail the size of the 
public  sector were  using several instruments. 
Of  course, the figures in  Table 3.1  reflect only the status of the various 
states as of  1982.  They  reveal little about the states' situations at the time 
that indexation was adopted.  What  factors might affect this decision?  In 
particular,  what effect  might a state's tax structure have on its indexing 
status?  There  is no standard  theoretical framework  to rely upon for 
generating hypotheses on  how  various variables influence the indexing 
decision.  This  is because, as  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  [1980, Chap.  10] and 
others have  noted, there is no  generally accepted theory of how public 
sector decisions are made. 
We  have found  it useful to think of indexing in the context of an 
informal  model in  which legislators seek to maximize  the likelihood of staying 
in  office over a given time horizon.  Since voters like tax reductions (ceteris 
paribus), a legislator can enhance  the probability of wining his  next  election 
by  supporting indexing.6  However, once indexing is passed, it reduces the 
scope  for  tax reductions in  future  years.  And  if  voters are myopic  as 
suggested by  Fair [1982], Feldstein  [1980]  and  others, then  legislators cannot 
expect to be rewarded in the relatively distant future for  earlier support  of 
indexing.  Hence, the legislator's  choice  between  indexing  and a series  of ad 
hoc reductions in  the future depends  upon,  inter  alia:  i)  the legislator's 
discount rate  and  time horizon;  ii)  the extent  to which voters  in  the next 
election will  be influenced by  support  for  indexing;  iii) the extent to  which 
voters  in future elections will reward legislators who  voted  for indexing  in 
the past; and  iv)  the extent to which votes in  future  elections are influenced 
11 by a  series of ad hoc  Lax  decreases. 
Thus, as a state's income tax structure becomes more  progressive,7 there 
are two effects that work in  opposite  directions.  First, as progressivity 
increases, so  does  the cost of  indexation  in terms of lost opportunities for 
future tax reductions.  This  tends  to  reduce support for  indexing.  The 
second effect of increased progressivity  is to increase the present value of 
the stream of tax reductions  implicit in  the indexing  law.  This  tends to 
increase support  for indexing.  In short, the tradeoffs inherent  in  the 
decision  to index are made  more  dramatic  when progressivity  increases. 
Whether this  tends  to  increase or decrease the probability of indexing  cannot 
be  known  a priori. 
Another  variable that might  affect the indexation  decision is the 
importance  of the personal income tax in the state's  revenue system. 
Suppose  that the costs  to  legislators of enacting a tax indexing statute do 
not  vary  proportionately with the size of the income tax.  In particular, there 
might  be fixed costs in  terms of time spent organizing a  coalition,  putting the 
statute through the legislative process, etc.  If such is the case, then  it 
would  be less worthwhile  to  enact an indexing statute when the income tax is 
relatively unimportant.  In short,  we expect  that as the proportion of state 
tax revenue attributable to the personal income tax  increases, so  does  the 
probability of indexing,  ceteris  paribus. 
The state's financial environment might also affect the indexing decision. 
One expects  that when a state is under financial stress, its legislators  will  be 
unlikely to abandon a potentially important source of revenue, ceteris 
paribus.  Hence, we expect states  with large  debt burdens  to be less likely 
to adopt indexing. 
We  consider next variables that might be reflective of a state's "tastes" 
12 for  indexing.  income  levels  might affect the political  views of voters and 
their elected representatives;  hence  we  will  examine the impact of per capita 
income on  the indexing  decision.  As  suggested earlier, another  indicator of 
the political  environment is the presence of  a  tax or expenditure limitation 
(TEL)  statute.  Perhaps  a  TEL  is indicative  of an underlying desire to 
curtail government, in  which case the presence of  a  TEL  would increase  the 
probability of  indexing.  Alternatively, it  could  be that if a state has adopted 
a  TEL ,  its  citizens require  no additional instruments to  control the size of 
the public  sector.  In this case, the presence of a  TEL  would  reduce the 
probability of indexing.  In any case, however,  care must  be taken in 
assessing  the relationship between  TEL's  and  indexing,  because the 
decisions to  adopt them  may  be made jointly. 
A  final  variable that  might affect the indexing  decision is the inflation 
rate itself.  rndexing would not be an issue at all  if-inflation were always 
zero.  Perhaps  the "correct' model is simply that  states  adopt indexing when 
the inflation  rate  is high,  and  then drop it when the inflation  rate is low. 
With  respect to the reneging  decision,  we  expect  the same variables to 
operate as  in  the decision to  index.  Nevertheless, we note  in  passing that  in 
a  number  of conversations with  state government officials,  we were  told  that 
the main reason for  reneging was to  deal with a  financial  crisis.  Issues  of 
tax structure never came up in these discussions. 
B.  An  Econometric Model  of Indexing Status 
In this  section we construct a Markov model of states' indexing  and 
reneging decisions.  In any  given  year, a state's income tax  system can be 
characterized  by  one of three conditions:  it is indexed;  it is not indexed 
and  has never been indexed;  or it is not  indexed,  but the state has reneged 
on an earlier  promise  to index.  The probabilities of  moving from one 
13 condition  to another  (transition probabilities) are defined in  Figure  3.1. 
Thus, the first row indicates that if a state fails to index  initially, the 
probability that it  will stay  non—indexed  is  (1—p)  ;  with  probability  p 
then, it  will join  the ranks of the indexing states.  The third cell  in  the first 
row  is zero because by definition,  a  state that has  never promised  to index 
cannot renege.  Similarly, from the second row, the probability  that an 
indexing  state retains indexing is  (1—q) ;  the probability  that it reneges is 
q 
.  The  third  row implies that reneging is an absorbing condition--once  a 
state reneges, it never goes back to indexing.  Obviously,  from a  theoretical 
point of view this need not be the case, and indeed,  there  are several 
counterexamples  in Table  2.1.  As a practical matter, however, so few 
reneging states have actually returned to indexing  that it would be infeasible 
to  estimate the probability of that  event. 
We assume that transitions from period  t  to  t  + 1 depend  on variables 
dated period  t .  While we could  make  p  and  q  functions  of different 
variables,  in practice  we could  think  of no basis for including  some 
variables in one decision  and not the other.  Hence, Pt 
=  and 
= q(x) 
,  where  x  is a row vector.  Assuming  the convenient  logit 
specification  we can write 
xtb 
(3.1)  Pt 
=  e 
b 
= F(xtb) 
,  and 
1+et 
(3.2)  q  =  e 
F(xg) 
1 +  e 
14 Figure 3.1 
Period  t + 1 
no 
indexing  indexing  renege 
no indexing  (l—p)  p  0 
Period  t 
0  (1—q)  q 
indexing 
renege  0  0 
15 where  b  and  g  are parameter  vectors. 
Let 
d1 
be an indicator  variable  which takes  the value  1  if a state 
has no indexing  in period  t  and remains  unindexed in period  t + 1  ,  and 
zero  otherwise;  and 
d2 
= 1  if a state  starts  out being  indexed  and stays 
that way,  and zero otherwise.  Then the likelihood  function  associated  with 
Figure  3.1 is 
T—l  d  l—d 
(3.3)  L =  if  (  II  [F(xb)J [l  — F(xb)} 
1 
t=l  no indexing 
in t 
d  l—d 
if  [F(xg)]  2[l — F(xts)J  2) 
indexing 
in t 
where  T  is the  number of years in the sample.8 
At first  glance  the maximization  of (3.3)  appears to be a  messy 
nonlinear  problem.  However,  due to the Markov independence  assumption, 
L  separates  into two conventional  logit  equations,  so that standard 
software  routines  can be used.  Logit  1 selects  observations  which 
are not indexed  in period  t 
,  and  computes  the probability  that they  become 
indexed  in period  t + 1  .  A  state  that  becomes indexed  is assigned a one; 
a state  that remains  non—indexed  receives  a zero.  Logit 2 selects  all 
observations  which are indexed  in period  t 
,  and  computes  the  probability 
that  they  renege  in  period  t + 1  .  A state that  reneges is assigned  a 
one;  a state  that remains  indexed  receives  a zero.9 
Implementing  the statistical  model requires  that the 
vector  be apecified.  As noted  earlier,  we use debt per capita  to 
represent  "fiscal  stress;"  per capita income  and a  TEL  dichotomous  variable 
to represent  "political  tastes;"  and the share of the income  tax in total 
16 revenues to measure the importance  of income  taxation.  As also  observed 
above,  the income  tax structure  itself  can be characterized  by several 
different  variables,  e.g.,  the elasticity  of revenue  with respect to 
income,  or the marginal  tax rate at each  of several  income  levels.'0 
Ideally,  one would want to include  all of the tax structure  variables 
simultaneously  in  x 
,  and  ao  determine  their  relative  importance. 
However,  due to multicollinearity  among the various  measures  and 
the small nunber  of transitions  into indexing,  this strategy  proved  to be 
infeasible.  Instead,  we estimate the equations  several  times,  each  with an 
alternative  measure.  Finally,  in order to estimate  the impact  of the 
inflation  rate on the indexing  decision,  in some  variants  we include  it in 
All equations  are estimated  using data  from 1977 to 1984.  That 
is, the first transition  is from 1977  to 1978,  and the last from 1983  to 1984. 
The indexing  equation  has observations  on 258 transitions;  the reneging 
equation  has 32. 
C.  Results 
1.  The Indexing  Decision.  To  begin,  we estimate  models  with only 
tax structure  and fiscal  stress  variables.  The first column  of Table  3.2 
shows  the results  when the probability  of indexing  is a function  of the 
elasticity  of the income  tax system (e), the ratio  of income  tax revenue 
to total revenue  (s), and per capita  debt  (DEBT) 
.  The  positive 
coefficient  on  s  indicates  that the more important  the income  tax 
is in a state's  tax structure,  the higher  the probability  that it will 
adopt indexing.  This is consistent  with our earlier argument that there are 
fixed  costs to enacting indexing statutes,  and  hence indexation is less likely 
to  be adopted when the income tax is a relatively unimportant component of 
17 the state's revenue system. 
The positive coefficient on  e  shows that more elastic 
tax systems have a higher  probability  of being indexed.  The coefficient 
on  s  exceeds  its standard  error  by a factor  of  2.1;  for  a  the t—ratio 
is 1.93.  In terms of our earlier discussion  of the two effects that 
increasing  progressivity  can have on the probability  of indexing,  apparently 
the second  is dominant.  That is, the increased  likelihood  of a success 
in the next election  more than outweighs  the costs  of diminished  chances 
for success in future  elections.  The state's  financial  position 
as measured by  DEBT  also has an impact-—the  larger its per capita  debt, 
the less likely that a state will  adopt indexing.  This  coefficient,  moreover,  is 
significant at  conventional levels (t  —2.14).  We defer to later a discussion 
of the quantitative significance of the coefficients. 
We conjectured earlier  that  the impact of the form  of the income tax 
structure should depend on  the relative importance of the income tax in the 
state's revenue system.  This conjecture  is examined in  column (2) of Table 
(3.2), which  shows  the outcome when  a  is omitted from the indexing logit. 
As expected, failure to control for  the relative importance  of income  taxation 
renders  the income tax structure insignificant as a determinant of 
the indexing  decision.  Omission of  a  is a serious specification error.  Note 
also that the coefficient on  DEBT  falls both in absolute terms  and  relative 
to its standard error when  a  is omitted  from the equation. 
In order  to assess the robustness of the results  in column  (1),  we 
re—estimated the logit equation entering  the "taste" variables mentioned 
above, i.e.,  TEL  and  Y  .  The results, shown  in column  (3)  of Table  3.2, 
indicate the following:  1)  Neither  TEL'1  nor  Y  adds significantly to  the 
explanatory power of the equation (although  Y  is "close"  with  a t—statistic 
18 of  1.83).  However, the point estimates suggest that the probability of 
indexing  varies  positively with  each variable.  2)  The  coefficients on  the tax 
structure and  debt variables are fairly robust with  respect to the inclusion 
of  TEL  and  Y  .  Compared to  their counterparts  in column (1), the 
coefficients on  e  and  DEBT  are larger in  absolute value,  and  the 
coefficient on  a  is smaller.  But the basic  story is unchanged. 
Thus far,  our main substantive conclusion  is that the more progressive 
the income tax structure, the greater  the probability of indexing, 
ceteris  paribus.  We  now  investigate whether this conclusion  holds  up under 
several alternative  notions of "progressive.  Specifically,  we characterize the 
states' income tax structures by  their marginal tax rates at  the $10,000, 
$20,000  and  $40,000  income levels.  In  each case, we include  a  and  DEBT 
in  the equation, but omit  TEL  and  Y  •12 
The  outcomes  with  t10 
,  t20 
,  and  t40  are  reported in columns (4),  (5) 
and  (6)  of Table  3.2,  respectively.  The point estimates  suggest that income 
tax systems  with high marginal  tax rates at any given income  level  are more 
likely  to  index,  ceteris  paribus.  However,  the coefficients  are imprecisely 
estimated:  t10  is only 1.08 times  its standard  error,  t20 
has a t—ratio of 
1.72,  and 
t40 
a t—ratio  of 1.81. 
In short,  the results  from Table  3.2 indicate  that whether  we 
use marginal tax rates  or elasticities  as measures of tax structure, 
the main qualitative  result  is the same.  Namely,  tax systems that  are 
more prone to produce increasing  real tax rates  in the presence  of 
inflation  are more likely  to be indexed.  This  effect  shows  up most 
strongly  when the income  tax system is characterized  by its overall income 
elasticity. 
19 We  also experimented with an alternative measure  of fiscal stress,  the 
state's deficit in  the year  prior to which indexing was adopted.  In  all cases, 
DEFICIT  did  "worse"  than  DEBT  in  the sense of having smaller 
t—statistics.  (These results are available  upon request.)  Apparently, one 
particular  year's fiscal experience looms less important in  the indexing 
decision than the cumulative  effect of all  past fiscal decisions as  measured  by 
the debt. 
Next,  in  order  to  investigate the possibility that the inflation rate 
affects  the indexing  decision,  each of the equations in Table  3.2 was 
re—estimated including the inflation  rate  as a  right  hand  side variable.  The 
results, reported in  Table 3.3, suggest  that:  a)  the inflation rate is not 
statistically significant; and  b) its inclusion  does  not affect the qualitative 
results in  the rest of the table  very much.  Of course, it would be silly to 
interpret Table 3.3  as saying that inflation  has nothing to do with indexing 
decisions.  What  the Table  does say  is that during our  sample period, 
variations in the inflation rate  do not  do a very  good job of explaining when 
states chose  to  index. 
So far we have  confined  our  discussion to the qualitative aspects of the 
results.  To obtain  a sense of their quantitative significance, we assumed that 
the indexing  decision  was governed by the parameters in  column  1  of Table 
3.2,  and simulated  the response of the probability of indexing in a  given 
year, p ,  to changes in the various right hand side variables.  To 
begin we evaluated  equation (3.1)  at the  mean values  of the  xs 
and found  p = 0.00636.13  We then re—computed  (3.1) several  times, each 
time increasing  a single  right  hand side variable  by one standard 
deviation,  and leaving  all others  at their  means. 
20 The simulations  are reported  in  Table 3.4.  The tax structure variables 
have  very  powerful  effects on  p  •  A change  in  the elasticity from  1.59  to 
2.03  almost doubles the probability of indexing.  An increase in the share of 
income  taxes in  total  revenues  from 0.26 to 0.39  more  than  triples  the 
probability of  indexing.  The effect of  fiscal  stress is also important. 
Increasing  per capita debt from  $500  to $885  cuts  the probability that a state 
will index  by a factor of about 7. 
2.  The  Reneging  Decision.  We next turn  to  states' decisions to renege 
given that they  have adopted indexing.  As  noted  above,  to  be included  in 
the sample for  this  equation, a state must commit itself  to indexing. 
Consequently, the number of observations is much smaller  than  that for  the 
indexing equation.  Mechanically, the dependent variable for each  observation 
is determined as follows:  After the time the indexing  commitment is made, a 
state is assigned a value of zero for each  year the state continues to index, 
and a one  if it reneges.  Once a state reneges, it is out of the sample. 
The estimates are presented in Table 3.5.  As  one  would  hope,  they 
tend  to  mirror the results for  the indexing  equations in  Table 3.2.  Consider 
first columns (1),  (2),  and  (3), where the income tax structure is 
characterized by  e  ,  the  elasticity of revenues with  respect  to income.  In 
each equation, the coefficient on  e  is negative, suggesting that the more 
elastic the tax structure, the less likely is the state to abandon indexing.  As 
progressivity increases, the short run  'punishment" from abandoning 
indexing  exceeds the series of future  'rewards  generated  by  the ability to 
rant more ad hoc tax decreases.  However, unlike  their counterparts  in 
Table 3.2,  these coefficients are not  statistically significant.  We  conjecture 
that there are two  reasons  for  this.  First,  as just noted, the sample size  is 
quite small, which tends  to make it difficult to estimate parameters precisely. 
21 Second,  the sample consists of states  that  have chosen to  index, and  we 
already know from Tables 3.1 and 3.2 that such states  have higher 
than average elasticites.  Within this group there may simply  not  be  enough 
variation in  e  to  pin  down its coefficient.14 
The coefficients on  the debt variables in columns  (1),  (2) and  (3) 
indicate that  the larger a state's per capita debt, the more likely it is to 
renege on  its promise  to index.  In the reneging decision,  fiscal  stress  is 
more 'important' than  tax structure in the sense that its coefficient has a 
higher t—ratio.  Even  here, however, it falls a bit  below conventional levels 
for  statistical sigmificance. 
The results from  column (3) indicate that states with  TEL's  are less 
likely  to renege than  states  without  them, ceteris pribus.  Also,  the higher 
is per  capita income, the less likely is reneging to occur.  As  is the case 
with  the indexing decision,  however,  these variables are not  statistically 
significant, and  they  do not have much of an impact  on  the estimates of the 
other  parameters. 
Columns (4),  (5) and  (6),  indicate that  the higher are marginal  tax rates 
at any given income level, the lees likely the state is to  renege on  its 
promise to index.  However, like the elasticity variable in  column (1),  the 
coefficients on  the marginal  tax rates  are statistically insignificant.  Also as 
in  column (1), greater levels  of debt increase the probability that a state will 
renege on  its promise.  rn these equations, the t—statistics on  the debt 
variables are borderline significant by conventional criteria. 
Table 3.6  shows  the results when the various specifications in  Table 3.5 
are augmented  with  the inflation rate.  As  was the case for  the indexing 
equation, the inflation  rate is insignificant, and  does  not  have much of an 
effect on  the coefficients of the other variables. 
22 To  assess  the quantitative significance of the  estimates of the reneging 
logit estimates, we  follow a procedure analogous  to that used  to generate 
Table  3.4.  We  assume that behavior is governed by the coefficients in  the 
first column of  Table 3.5;  evaluate  q  of equation (3.2)  at  the mean values  of 
the right hand  side variables; and observe  how  q  changes when each of 
the variables is allowed to vary  by one  standard deviation.  The results are 
reported  in  Table 3.7.  A  change in  the elasticity from  1.85  to  2.20  reduces 
the probability of reneging in a  given  year from  0.14  to 0.07, a very  strong 
effect.  On  the other hand, changing the proportion of revenue collections 
attributable  to  the personal income tax  has a  negligible  effect on  the 
probability of reneging.  Relatively  high levels of debt  per  capita have a 
substantial  impact on  the likelihood  of reneging; increasing per capita debt 
from  $288  to  $534 would increase  the probability of reneging to almost  44 
percent. 
To  summarize the discussion surrounding  Tables  3.5  through  3.7:  A 
small sample  size  plus insufficient variation in the right hand  side variables 
make it impossible for  us  to obtain precise estimates of the determinants of 
reneging.  On  the basis of the point estimates,  however,  the  two  main 
conclusions are:  (1)  The  more  sensitive that real tax burdens  are to 
increases in  nominal income,  the less likely is a state to renege on a  promise 
to index;  and  (2) Debt burdens  play an important role  in  states' decisions to 
abandon indexing. 
IV.  Conclusions 
This  paper has examined the  experience with the indexing of 
their personal income taxes.  The  main findings are: 
1.  Most of the states  that committed themselves  to  indexing  reneged on 
their promises. 
23 2.  Among  indexing  states,  there is considerable heterogeneity with 
respect  to  the items that are indexed,  and  the adjustment factor used  to 
change these  items when  the price level increases. 
3.  In the period  1978—1984,  several states  were over-indexed.  That is, 
when nominal incomes rose, real tax revenues  fell.  This  phenomenon was  due 
to  the deductibility of  (unindexed)  federal tax liabilities on  state returns. 
4.  A  state's indexing status depends on  its tax structure, inter  alia. 
The more that real  tax  burdens  increase with  income, the more likely is a 
state to index, and  the less likely  it is to renege. 
5.  States with  high levels of per  capita debt are less likely to index, 
and  more likely to  renege on a promise  to index. 
Do  these results tell us  anything about the prospects for continued 
federal income tax indexing?  Clearly,  it is not  necessarily true that federal 
and  state decision—making  are governed by the same process.  Suppose, 
however,  that  similar  considerations do come  into  play.  If so, the current 
high levels of federal debt  together with  the decrease in  marginal  tax rates 
associated with the Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  suggest a  strong  possibility that 
indexing  will  be repealed.  In this context,  it is interesting  to  note that at 
various times,  Sweden,  the Netherlands, France, the United  Kingdom, and 
Canada adopted some form  of ".  .  .  automatic adjustment of individual income 
tax rats brackets  and  exemptions  for inflation.  Yet the adjustments were 
either omitted  or reduced frequently  to avoid  the revenue reductions that 
would otherwise take place."  (Pechman [1986,  pp. 2-3  Apparently, reneging 
on promises  to  index  is not a practice confined  to sub—national levels of 
government. 
Finally,  our paper has discussed the response of states' indexing 
decisions  to the structures of their tax systems, but it has not attempted to 
24 account for  differences in  the tax structures themselves.  Recently,  several 
papers have examined cross sectional differences in  the choice  of  tax 
instrumentsJ5  Such  papers attempt to explain  why, for example, some 
jurisdictions rely more heavily on income taxation than  others.  They pay 
little attention to the fact that  the tax instruments themselves vary 
substantially with  respect  to  their progressivity.  Investigating the sources 
of  tax structure heterogeneity is an important topic for future research. 
25 Table 2.1 
Indexing of State Income Taxesa 
1978—1985 
State  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Arizona  10.1  11.4  16.0  11.7  8.8  1.7  4.3  5.8 
California  5.2  6.9  17.3  8.3  9.3  —1.2  4.6  4.6 
Colorado  6.0  7.0  9.0  8.0  6.0  *  *  * 
Iowa  2.3  *  *  *  *  *  * 
Maine  *  *  2.2  1.8  2.0 
Minnesota  10.1  8.6  9.2  2.0  .8  2.7  n.a.b 
Montana  10.0  7.3  2.1  4.2  3.8 
Oregon  *  *  *  *  * 
South  Carolina  *  *  1.0  4.0 
Wisconsin  10  9.6  7.1  *  *  * 
Change  in CPI  7.7  11.3  13.5  10.4  6.1  3.2  4.3  3.6 
Source:  Commerce  Clearing House, State Tax Review,  various  issues;  tax 
return  forms  for the states;  and direct  communication  with 
several  state  revenue  offices.  CPI figures are from  Economic Report 
of the President,  1986. 
aThe  figure  for each year is the adjustment  factor  applied to the indexed 
items in the state's  tax system.  An asterisk  (*)  indicates  that indexing 
was promised  for that year,  but then suspended. 
b Minnesota  adopted a new rate  schedule  in 1985.  This schedule is indexed. 
Thus, while  Minnesota  never reneged  on its promise  to index,  its  1985 
schedule  was not determined  by applying  an adjustment  factor  to the 1984 
schedule. 
26 Table 2.2 
The Thoroughness of Indexing* 
1978— 1984 
State  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Arizona  1.44  1.47  1.14  1.07  1.10  1.09  1.08 
[1.44]  [1.45]  [1.15]  [1.07]  [1.101  [1.11]  [1.07] 
California  0.47  0.47  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.88  0.87 
[0.56]  [0.64]  [0.87]  [0.87]  [0.86]  [0.89]  [0.87] 
Colorado  1.58  1.53  1.48  1.59  1.44 
[1.54]  [1.46]  [1.49]  [1.52]  [1.43] 
Iowa 
—  0.27 
[0.29] 
Maine  —  —  —  —  —  0.47  0.46 
[0.47]  [0.46] 
Minnesota  —  1.21  1.31  0.63  0.53  0.52  0.50 
[1.24]  [1.33]  [0.67]  [0.52]  [0.51]  [0.49] 
Montana  —  —  —  1.50  1.34  1.28  1.23 
[1.41]  [1.34]  [1.29]  [1.23] 
South Carolina  —  —  —  —  —  —  0.23 
[0.23] 
Wisconsin 
—  —  0.58  0.56  0.63 
[0.55]  [0.57]  [0.63] 
*The figures  without brackets represent  the share of inflation—induced 
increases in real  revenue returned to the taxayer assuming  6  percent 
inflation.  The figures surrounded  by  brackets  represent  the share  of 
inflation—induced increases in real income returned  to the taxpayer given the 
actual inflation  experience. 
27 Table 3.1 
Means  of the Variables  (1982)* 
Indexing  Non—Indexing 
States  States 
P  (population)  5028  4494 
(2217)  (685.8) 
Y  (personal income per capita)  6718  6787 
(245.0)  (177.6) 
EXP (state general expenditure  895.4  865.3 
per capita)  (37.27)  (32.59) 
DEFICIT (state deficit per capita)  —48.14  —51.04 
(14.08)  (10.57) 
DEBT (state debt per capita)  424.4  503.5 
(129.77)  (66.95) 
s (share of personal income tax  0.361  0.267 
in total revenue)  (0.0345)  (0.0240) 
e (elasticity of personal income tax  1.80  1.53 
revenue with respect to income)  (0.0966)  (0.0692) 
t10 (marginal personal income tax  5.49  3.64 
rate on a household with  (1.17)  (0.343) 
taxable income of $10,000) 
t20  (marginal personal income tax  6.29  4.52 
rate on a household with  (0.637)  (0.476) 
taxable income of $20,000) 
t40 (marginal personal income tax  7.23  4.89 
rate on a household with  (0.696)  (0.480) 
taxable income of $40,000) 
TEL (= 1  if there is a tax and/or  0.600  0.272 
expenditure limitation statute,  (0.163)  (0.0787) 
and zero otherwise) 
*Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of the means.  All 
dollar amounts are expressed in 1977 dollars. 
28 Table 3.2 
Logit  Results For  the Decision to  Index* 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intercept  —8.461  —3.301  —17.20  —4.999  —4.927  —5.926 
(2.818)  (1.238)  (6.524)  (1.784)  (1.675)  (1.899) 
12.18  —  8.920  4.116  2.826  4.482 
(5.700)  —  (5.847)  (7.371)  6.789  (5.995) 
1.740  0.6306  1.753 
(0.9007)  (0.6146)  (0.9877) 
DEBT  —0.5144  —0.4032  —0.6178  —0.4305  —0.5348  —0.5182 
(0.2404)  (0.2369)  (0.2568)  (0.2371)  (0.2582)  (0.2359) 
—  0.1708 
—  (1.213) 
—  1.416 
—  (0.775) 
—  0.4008 
—  (0.3697) 
t2 
—  —  0.4188  0  —  —  (0.2427) 
t 
—  —  0.4573  40  —  —  (0.2521) 
—26.16  —29.06  —23.49  —27.12  —26.22  —25.95 
* Numbers  in parentheses  are standard errors.  The debt variable is scaled 
so that it is measured in hundreds of dollars 
29 Table  3.3 
Logit Results  for the Decision to  Index* 
(Inflation  Rate Included) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intercept  —9.532  —4.069  —6.069  —6.054  —5.874  —7.166 
(3.186)  (1.764)  (4.831)  (2.315)  (2.260)  (2.476) 
s  12.52  —  2.156  4.513  2.231  4.777 
(5.760)  —  4.993)  (7.574)  (7.020)  (6.252) 
e  1.760  0.6370  0.4928 
(0.9073)  (0.6124)  (0.9474) 
DEBT  —0.5260  —0.4037  —0.3853  —0.4337  —0.5502  —0.5265 
(0.2422)  (0.2394)  (0.2378)  (0.2395)  (0.2673)  (0.2375) 
TEL  —  0.05159 
—  (1.200) 
Y  —  —  0.3205 
—  (0.6126) 
t10  —  —  0.4105 
—  —  (0.3742) 
t20  —  0.4555 
—  (0.2509) 
t40  —  0.4771 
—  (0.2575) 
10.73  8.430  3.373  10.01  10.51  11.66 
(13.71)  (13.22)  (14.60)  (12.84)  (13.45)  (13.44) 
—25.85  —28.85  —26.93  —26.81  —25.86  —25.57 
in parentheses  are standard errors.  The debt variable  is scaled 
so  that  it is measured  in  hundreds  of  dollars. 
30 Table  3.4 
Response of  p  to Changes  in Right  Hand Side  Variables 
Mean  value plus  p  changes  from 
Variable  Mean value  one s.d.  0.00636  to: 
e  1.59  2.03  0.0135 
s  0.264  0.388  0.0282 
DEBT  5.00  8.85  0.000882 
31 Table  3.5 
Logit  Results  for  the Decision to RenegeS 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intercept  0.5881  0.5968  7.161  —2.t47  —2.185  —1.689 
(3.150)  (2.797)  (6.771)  (3.179)  (3.041)  (2.523) 
s  0.04891  —  —1.875  4.936  9.293  3.153 
(8.106) 
—  (10.33)  (9.061)  (11.47)  (9.223 
e  —2.270  —2.267  —2.987 
(1.745)  (1.673)  (2.407) 
— 
DEBT  0.6294  0.6302  0.5377  0.5480  1.271  0.9922 
(0.3893)  (0.3676)  (0.3976)  (1.627)  (0.7008)  (0.5419) 
TEL 
—  —1.705 
—  (1.472) 
Y  —  —0.5082 
—  (1.028) 
—  —0.6648 
—  (0.8016) 
t20 
—  —  —1.019 
—  —  (0.7423) 
t40 
—  —0.5512 
—  (0.3923) 
lnL  —11.82  —11.82  —10.89  —10.95  —10.53  —11.53 
*Numbers in parentheses are standard  errors.  The debt variable is scaled 
so that it is measured in hundreds  of dollars. 
- 
32 Table  3.6 
Logit Results for  the Decision to  Renege* 
(Inflation  Rate Included) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intercept  0.1696  0.1900  7.099  —2.814  —2.588  —2.017 
(3.599)  (3.249)  (6.888)  (3.560)  (3.446)  (2.982) 
0.1068  —  —1.731  4.946  9.898  1.968 
(8.083)  —  (10.72)  (9.062)  (11.55)  (8.945) 
—2.253  —2.248  —2.950 
(1.738)  (1.673)  (2.497) 
DEBT  0.6301  0.6317  0.5287  0.8858  1.303  0.9256 
(0.3928)  (0.3728)  (0.4340)  (0.5459)  (0.7198)  (0.5291) 
TEL  —  —1.681 
—  (1.539) 
-  —0.5258 
—  (1.086) 
—  —0.6607 
—  (0.7879) 
—  —  —1.056 
—  (0.7612) 
—  —0.4985 
—  (0.3838) 
3.829  3.824  0.9281  1.729  3.491  5.475 
(15.84)  (15.84)  (17.77)  (16.65)  (16.82)  (16.61) 
—11.79  —11.79  —10.88  —10.95  —10.49  —11.46 
tNumbers  in  parentheses are standard  errors.  The  debt variable is scaled so  that it is measured in  hundreds of dollars. 
33 Table  3.7 
Response  of  q  to Changes in Right Hand  Side  Variables 
Mean value plus  g  changes  from 
Variable  Mean value  one  s.d.  0.144  to: 
e  1.85  2.20  0.0706 
s  0.327  0.420  0.145 
DEBT  2.88  5.34  0.442 
34 NOTES 
1.  Less  well understood,  but also important,  is the fact  that even  with  a 
simple  proportional  tax, inflation  changes  the effective  tax rate  on 
capital  income.  This is because  the inflationary  components  of  capital 
gains and interest  income  are subject  to tax.  We do not deal  with this 
issue  in the present  paper. 
2.  For a discussion  of the macroeconomic  consequences  of tax indexing,  see 
Pierce  and Enzler [1976]. 
3.  Six states (Idaho, Nebraska,  New Mexico,  North  Dakota,  South  Carolina, 
and Utah)  base their  taxes,  in  part,  on indexed portions  of the federal 
law, thus indirectly  imparting  an element of indexation  into  their  own 
statutes.  However,  these  changes become  relevant  only  after  the time 
period  under  consideration  in this  paper. 
4.  Since  the question  of indexing  vs. non—indexing  is relevant  only  for 
states with a personal  income  tax,  those seven  states  without one are 
excluded.  (Alaska, which abandoned  its income  tax in  1979,  is excluded 
from the sample.) 
5.  Statistical  significance  is determined  on the basis  of the usual  t—test 
for the hypothesis  that the difference  between  two means is  zero. 
Because  the number  of indexing  states  is small, the test is only 
approximately  correct. 
6.  The "other  things"  include  the level  and composition  of state expenditure. 
Although  explicit  consideration  of the spending  side  would complicate  our 
discussion,  we do not think  that it would  change  its tenor. 
7.  As suggested  above,  "progressivity"  can be measured  in several  ways. 
For present  purposes,  it is sufficient  to think of progressivity 
loosely as the extent  to which  real tax burdens  increase  in response 
to changes  in nominal  income. 
8.  As an alternative  to equation (3.3), one might consider  employing  a 
hazard  model,  which  explicitly  considers  the length  of time  required 
for some event  to occur.  However,  specification  of a hazard  model 
requires  that the initial  condition  of the process  be known.  For the 
indexing  decision,  however,  there  is no obvious birth date.  For the 
reneging  decision,  the date that indexation  was adopted might be used 
as the starting  point.  But given  the small  number  of observations, 
it is unlikely  that the parameters  of a reneging  hazard  function  could 
be estimated  with any precision.  Note that it is necessary  to include 
all states  in the sample,  not just those with tax legislation  in a given 
year.  The decision  to modify the tax law is endogenous,  and selecting 
on an endogenous  variables  renders  the coefficients  inconsistent. 
9. Recall  from our discussion  of Table  2.1 that some  states  reneged  on 
their  promise  to index  even  before  indexing  was implemented.  In this 
context,  we view the vote for indexing  rather  than its implementation 
as the crucial  event.  Hence, these states  are assigned  a value  of 1 
35 in each logit equation.  However,  our substantive  results  are not 
sensitive  to these  observations  being  omitted. 
10.  One might  argue that the progressivity  of the tax structure  is 
determined  jointly  with the decision  to index.  However,  our earlier 
calculations  (see Feenberg  and Rosen [1986])  indicate  that the states' 
tax structures  change  very little over time; hence, we regard  the 
possibility  that progressivity  is endogenous  to the indexing  decision 
as a remote  one. 
11.  However,  given  the possible  endogeneity  of  TEL  ,  this result  must  be 
viewed  cautiously. 
12.  When analogues  to the specifications  in columns  (2)  and (3) of Table  3.2 
were estimated  with the various  marginal  tax rates inatead  of  e  ,  the 
results were qualitatively  similar:  omitting  a  renders  the tax struc- 
ture variable  insignificant;  and  Y  and  TEL  are statistically  insigni- 
ficant. 
13. Means  are taken  only  over  the obaervetiona  used to estimate  the indexing 
logit.  Hence, they  differ  from  those  presented  in Table  3.1.  One might 
wonder  why the value  of  p  evaluated  at the means is so small  (0.00636) 
in light  of the fact that 10 states chose  to index.  In  effect,  p 
measures  the probability  that any given  transition  is from  non—indexing 
into indexing.  In the indexing  logit,  there are many  more observations 
in which states  remain  non—indexed  than those  in which they  choose  to 
index. 
14.  lnthe aample  used to estimate  the indexing  equation,  the coefficients  of 
variation  for  e and  a  are 0.280 and 0.472,  respectively.  In the re- 
neging  equation,  the corresponding  figures  are 0.191 and 0.287.  The com— 
parison  indicates  that there  is less variation  in the sample  used to 
estimate  the reneging  equation. 
15. See, e.g.,  Feldatein  and Metcalf  [1987] and Holts—Eakin  and Rosen 
[forthcoming]. 
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38 APP ENDtX 
This Appendix  documents  the sources of data employed  in  the statistical 
analysis. 
All  figures  on  state public finance (expenditures, revenues,  deficits,  and 
debts) are from  various editions of U.S. Department  of Commerce, State 
Government Finances.  Data for  1977 are found  in  the 1978 edition,  1978 data 
in  the 1979  edition, etc.  Population  data for  1977 through  1979 are in  the 
1979  through  1981 editions of  U.S. Department  of Commerce, State Government 
Tax  Collections.  The  1980 through  1983  population  figures are from Current 
B2jpulation Report, Series P—25.  1944,  "Estimates of the Population  of States 
1980—1983," January  1984. 
Total personal income by  states for  1977—83 is from  Department  of 
Commerce, Survey of Current  Business, August  1984. 
The marginal tax rates  and elasticities of the income tax structures are 
updated  versions of the figures  in  Feenberg and  Rosen  (1986].  They are 
calculated using individual income and  deduction data from a stratified 
random  sample of actual income tax returns.  Marginal  tax rates are found by 
incrementing the wage  income of each household in  the sample  by  $100,  and 
calculating the associated change in tax liabilities.  Similarly,  elasticities are 
calculated by examining the consequences of a one percent increase in 
income.  Nominal dollar values for  income were  converted into  1977  terms by 
use of regional price  deflators found  in various editions of the Statistical 
Abstract of the United  States.  The price deflator  for  state and  local public 
goods is from various editions of the U.S. Department  of  Commerce,  Survey of 
Current Business.  (September 1981,  July  1983 and  July  1984.) 
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